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	<title>Comments on: The Two Personal Finance Lessons We Should Learn from the Demise of U.S. Investment Banks</title>
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	<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/</link>
	<description>The Hard Truth about Money and Personal Finance</description>
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		<title>By: Mr. ToughMoneyLove</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-522</link>
		<dc:creator>Mr. ToughMoneyLove</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 02:28:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-522</guid>
		<description>Gerard:  I agree that most homeowners should have known that the loan terms being offered were not reasonable based on their net worth and cash flow. On the other hand, the lender and/or mortgage broker had actual knowledge that the loan terms were not tenable but convinced the borrower that values were increasing and that refinancing would be possible before the rates re-set.  My beef is that the naivete of the borrowers and conniving by the lenders combined to create financial products that have led to a market meltdown.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gerard:  I agree that most homeowners should have known that the loan terms being offered were not reasonable based on their net worth and cash flow. On the other hand, the lender and/or mortgage broker had actual knowledge that the loan terms were not tenable but convinced the borrower that values were increasing and that refinancing would be possible before the rates re-set.  My beef is that the naivete of the borrowers and conniving by the lenders combined to create financial products that have led to a market meltdown.</p>
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		<title>By: Gerard</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-521</link>
		<dc:creator>Gerard</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 02:07:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-521</guid>
		<description>&quot;No one was telling the homeowner-borrower that there was a high probability that you will be in default&quot;

I&#039;m not sure if I am misunderstanding your statement. While I agree that some of the products on offer were complex, any reasonable person should have an idea of how high a monthly payment they can service. In fact, I would suggest that most buyers realised this but took the loan out anyway because, &quot;well the banks giving away money&quot;. See page 3 (Clarence Nathan)http://thislife.org/extras/radio/355_transcript.pdf for an example.

The only exception is the case where the mortgage brokers were selling something they knew was a bad product and I have some sympathy for those people who effectively got &quot;duped&quot;. Still, it&#039;s your money and you make the decisions, regardless of external influences...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;No one was telling the homeowner-borrower that there was a high probability that you will be in default&#8221;</p>
<p>I&#8217;m not sure if I am misunderstanding your statement. While I agree that some of the products on offer were complex, any reasonable person should have an idea of how high a monthly payment they can service. In fact, I would suggest that most buyers realised this but took the loan out anyway because, &#8220;well the banks giving away money&#8221;. See page 3 (Clarence Nathan)http://thislife.org/extras/radio/355_transcript.pdf for an example.</p>
<p>The only exception is the case where the mortgage brokers were selling something they knew was a bad product and I have some sympathy for those people who effectively got &#8220;duped&#8221;. Still, it&#8217;s your money and you make the decisions, regardless of external influences&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Mr. ToughMoneyLove</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-512</link>
		<dc:creator>Mr. ToughMoneyLove</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 22:39:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-512</guid>
		<description>Sarah - Thanks for visiting.  Your point is well taken but as you suggest, to the rest of us there was pretense about the validity of the debt between the borrowers and the first tier lenders.  No one was telling the homeowner-borrower that there was a high probability that you will be in default.  Those lenders weren&#039;t telling their shareholders that either.  The rating agencies lacked reliable metrics to quantify the risk and, as you say, they lacked motivation to do so.  Then the mark-to-market rule came crashing down on all of them.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sarah &#8211; Thanks for visiting.  Your point is well taken but as you suggest, to the rest of us there was pretense about the validity of the debt between the borrowers and the first tier lenders.  No one was telling the homeowner-borrower that there was a high probability that you will be in default.  Those lenders weren&#8217;t telling their shareholders that either.  The rating agencies lacked reliable metrics to quantify the risk and, as you say, they lacked motivation to do so.  Then the mark-to-market rule came crashing down on all of them.</p>
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		<title>By: Sarah</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-511</link>
		<dc:creator>Sarah</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 21:47:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-511</guid>
		<description>&quot;securitized packages of real estate loans and related assets, thought to be safe and therefore propped up by “good debt.”&quot;

No, not really.  The basic theory behind a lot of these CDOs was that if you bundle together enough bad debt, at least the first x percentage of payments due will be made each month.  (If 90% of the payments aren&#039;t made, but you are owed the first 10% that comes in, you suffer no loss at all.)  Therefore, if you buy the rights to that first percentage, you are supposed to be fairly safe, even though the underlying assets are not much good at all.  This was the fig leaf for the rating agencies (who were being paid to rate the securities by the companies who issued them, by the way) to let them issue investment-grade ratings to these &quot;tranches&quot; of securities.

To put it briefly, it was always known that this debt was no good.  It was originated by people who knew the defaults would be someone else&#039;s problem and repackaged and sold by people who knew the defaults would be someone else&#039;s problem and bought by people who thought (incorrectly) that they could manipulate the bad debt to squeeze some &quot;safety&quot; out of it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;securitized packages of real estate loans and related assets, thought to be safe and therefore propped up by “good debt.”&#8221;</p>
<p>No, not really.  The basic theory behind a lot of these CDOs was that if you bundle together enough bad debt, at least the first x percentage of payments due will be made each month.  (If 90% of the payments aren&#8217;t made, but you are owed the first 10% that comes in, you suffer no loss at all.)  Therefore, if you buy the rights to that first percentage, you are supposed to be fairly safe, even though the underlying assets are not much good at all.  This was the fig leaf for the rating agencies (who were being paid to rate the securities by the companies who issued them, by the way) to let them issue investment-grade ratings to these &#8220;tranches&#8221; of securities.</p>
<p>To put it briefly, it was always known that this debt was no good.  It was originated by people who knew the defaults would be someone else&#8217;s problem and repackaged and sold by people who knew the defaults would be someone else&#8217;s problem and bought by people who thought (incorrectly) that they could manipulate the bad debt to squeeze some &#8220;safety&#8221; out of it.</p>
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		<title>By: The Simple Dollar &#187; The Simple Dollar Weekly Roundup: Merging Checking Accounts Edition</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-506</link>
		<dc:creator>The Simple Dollar &#187; The Simple Dollar Weekly Roundup: Merging Checking Accounts Edition</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 14:01:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-506</guid>
		<description>[...] The Two Personal Finance Lessons We Should Learn from the Demise of U.S. Investment Banks Good insights into the fiascos at Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. (@ tough money love)   Related Posts A Two Checking Account System: Why It Works For MeThe Simple Dollar Morning Roundup: Waiting On My Laptop EditionThe Simple Dollar Weekly Roundup: Crunch EditionOur Path to (Finally) Merging Our FinancesThinking Of Making A Banking Change? Here&#8217;s How To Compare Competing Bank Accounts     Did you like this article? You can get the complete text of all the latest articles at The Simple Dollar in your email inbox each morning by entering your email address below. Your address will only be used for mailing you the articles, and each one will include a link so you can unsubscribe at any time.      Report an unethical ad     No comments yet. Be the first.  Leave a reply [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] The Two Personal Finance Lessons We Should Learn from the Demise of U.S. Investment Banks Good insights into the fiascos at Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. (@ tough money love)   Related Posts A Two Checking Account System: Why It Works For MeThe Simple Dollar Morning Roundup: Waiting On My Laptop EditionThe Simple Dollar Weekly Roundup: Crunch EditionOur Path to (Finally) Merging Our FinancesThinking Of Making A Banking Change? Here&#8217;s How To Compare Competing Bank Accounts     Did you like this article? You can get the complete text of all the latest articles at The Simple Dollar in your email inbox each morning by entering your email address below. Your address will only be used for mailing you the articles, and each one will include a link so you can unsubscribe at any time.      Report an unethical ad     No comments yet. Be the first.  Leave a reply [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Uncommonadvice</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-493</link>
		<dc:creator>Uncommonadvice</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 15:23:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-493</guid>
		<description>It&#039;s funny that you should bring up the concepts of good and bad debt - I was just thinking about this, this morning. It&#039;s very clear now that our mortgages are actually &quot;Bad Debt&quot;. Our houses are liabilities!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s funny that you should bring up the concepts of good and bad debt &#8211; I was just thinking about this, this morning. It&#8217;s very clear now that our mortgages are actually &#8220;Bad Debt&#8221;. Our houses are liabilities!</p>
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		<title>By: Matt @ Steadfast Finances</title>
		<link>http://toughmoneylove.com/2008/09/15/the-two-personal-finance-lessons-we-should-learn-from-the-demise-of-us-investment-banks/comment-page-1/#comment-468</link>
		<dc:creator>Matt @ Steadfast Finances</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 14:10:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://toughmoneylove.com/?p=98#comment-468</guid>
		<description>I think it&#039;s a perfect example displaying the dangers of &quot;buying at the top&quot;.  These two firms grew their assets assuming those assets would never decline in value.  Nothing appreciates at a linear rate, and even the most seemingly bulletproof investments can falter.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think it&#8217;s a perfect example displaying the dangers of &#8220;buying at the top&#8221;.  These two firms grew their assets assuming those assets would never decline in value.  Nothing appreciates at a linear rate, and even the most seemingly bulletproof investments can falter.</p>
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